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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
r

.t NF VA PIPE COMPANY,

, tllalr corporation,

Plain tiff and Appellant,
VS

S&H INSURANCE COMPANY,
a California corporation,
Defendant and Respondent,

Case No. 19273

VS

JOHN W MAUGHAN and
GLADEAN MAUGHAN,

Third-Party Defendants
and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT S&H INSURANCE COMPANY

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by a subcontractor on two municipal projects to recover
from the surety on two payment bonds the sum of $117,250.40 claimed to be
owing by the prime contractor.

The subcontractor also sought interest at the

rate of 18% and reasonable attorneys 1 fees.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The court granted the surety's motion for summary judgment and entered
Jildgmen t dismissing the action with prejudice,
r ec'lvery

limiting the subcontractor's

to funds previously deposited in court by the surety, to-wit,

- 1 -
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$77,992.16, and ordering that the funds be paid over to the subcontractui
upon its ex parte motion.
an

order

was

entered

A motion for a release of the deposit was made .in.
by

the court

directing

the

treasurer

rof

"""

.I•.,

County to pay the sums to the order of the subcontractor.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent S&H Insurance Company seeks affirrnance of the judgmen1
the trial court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The

surety

(respondent

S&H Insurance

Company)

agrees

with

th,

appellant's statement of facts insofar as it describes the construction project
the bonds,

and the total value of the labor and materials supplied at tlit

request of Jonco Construction
Jonco Construction

Company.

Company was

It agrees that $105 ,000 paid b1

applied

by

the subcontractor (appellant

Geneva Pipe Company) as payment on the Monticello projects

And it agreeo

that the subcontractor received two checks, one in the amount of $45,000 and
one in the amount of $7 ,500 from Jonco Construction Company which it applied
on open accounts that had nothing to do with the Monticello projects
Some additional facts are material.

At the time the payments were made

by Jonco, no demand was made by the subcontractor for a designation of the
account
(R. 74).
John W.

and
In

the
an

items

of

affidavit

accounts

to

supporting

which
the

the

motion

payment
for

was

summary

to appll'
iuctgmenr

Maughan swore that when he learned that the funds had not beer·

applied to the Monticello job, he notified the subcontractor that they sh 01110
be so applied (R. 73), but the subcontractor states there is a dispute
this matter, though the record on appeal does not contain a copy of the
- 2 -
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affidavit of the subcontractor's president referred to in paragraph 3 of the
'.t:irement of facts
The $52. 500 applied by the subcontractor to open accounts of Jonco
truction Company was from funds paid by the City of Monticello to Jonco

, u"'

labor and materials furnished in connection with the two city projects
IR

73)

While the action was

pending,

the surety filed a motion for leave to

•leposit funds into court,

This was based upon an analysis of the value of

the

furnished

labor

and

$222, 250. 40,

materials

less

the

$105, 000

as

computed

applied

toward

by

the

payment of

subcontractor,
the materials

delivered to the Monticello Projects, leaving a balance of $117,250.40, less the
$52, 500 of Monticello funds that were applied by the subcontractor on open

accounts,

leaving a balance as of January 31,

1982,

of $64,750.40.

The

surety then added interest through March 31, 1983, and tendered into court
the sum of $77, 992. 16, as permitted by a court order signed on April 21,
1983,

the

The computation of the amount tendered is set out in the attachment to
affidavit

of

Michael R.

Vowles

at

R. 64.

(The

attachment

shows

$64, 913. 21 principal due to Geneva Pipe Company as of January 31, 1982, or
$162 81 more than the figure as computed above, and inasmuch as the. error

is in the subcontractor's favor, this discrepancy should create no problem in
connection with

In any event there has been no

the summary judgment.

rontention in the appellant's brief that this figure is incorrect if the surety is
correct on the law.)
The deposit was made, and on June 6, 1983, after entry of the summary
Judgment,

on

motion

of

Geneva

Pipe

Company,

the

court

ordered the

treasurer of San Juan County to pay the funds to the company (R · 116'

- 3 -
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117).

On June 15, 1983, Geneva Pipe Company filed a notice of appeal ~ 11

the district court.

ARGUMENT

DEFENDANT HAD A DUTY TO DEMAND A DESIGNATION OF THE
ACCOUNT TO WHICH PAYMENTS BY JON CO CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY SHOULD BE APPLIED, AND ITS FAILURE TO DEMAND
THE DESIGNATION IS A DEFENSE TO ITS CLAIM AGAINST THE
SURETY ON JONCO'S PAYMENT BOND.
The primary issue in this case is whether a subcontractor or materialmor.
on a public construction project,

upon

receiving payment by

the genm.

contractor, may apply the payment as it chooses.
The early Utah case of Salt Lake City v. O'Connor, 68 Utah 233, 249 P
810 (1926), held that as against the surety on a payment bond, a materialmar.
who had no knowledge of the source of funds paid to him, had a right t:
apply the payments as directed by the contractor
Commission v.
770-771

(1943),

surety,

a

Great American

Indemnity

Co. ,

In Utah State Building

105 Utah 11,

140 P 2d 160

the court held that as against a prime contractor and his

materialman

who

had

received

payments

from

a subcontractor

without any direction for application and without knowledge of the source

<'!

the funds, was free to apply the payment as it chose.
Davis

County

Board

of

Education

v.

Underwood,

10 Utah2d

14.\

349 P. 2d 722 (1960), upheld the right of a materialman to apply payments a'
it chose, where the jury found that the surety had failed to prove that th·
money applied had been received by the contractor for work done on the :
to which the bond applied.

1

The jury also found that there was no knowied;·

on the part of the materialman as to the source of the money

- 4 -
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Tlie question

1 u,Jgm~n t,
1 .,

rgomg cases,

. '' ,:,~
thee

and

before the trial court on defendant's motion for summary

before

this

court

now,

is

the subcontractor was free

whether,

on the basis of the

to apply two payments as it

ur whether it was required to apply them to the bonded projects of

City of Monticello.

The subcontractor relied upon the cited cases, while

th•· surety relied upon the provisions of 58A-l-19 Utah Code Annotated 1953
Jnd Western Ready-Mix Concrete Company v. Rodriguez, 567 P. 2d 1118 (Utah
The statutory provision, 58A-l-19, reads as follows:

1977)

Any owner or contractor in making any payment to a
materialman, contractor, or subcontractor with whom he has a
running account, or with whom he has more than one contract, or
to whom he is otherwise indebted, shall designate the contract
under which the payment is made or the items of account to which
it is to be applied. When a payment for materials or labor is made
to a subcontractor,
or materialman, such subcontractor or
materialman shall demand of the person making such payment a
designation of the account and the items of account to which the
payment is to apply.
In ~ case where !I: lien ~ claimed for
materials furnished or labor performed ~ !I: subcontractor or
materialman, it shall be a defense to the claim that a payment made,
by the owner ~the -contractor-for- the materials has been so
designated, and paid over to the subcontractor or materialman, and
that when the payment was received ~ the subcontractor or
materialman he did not demand !I: designation ~ the account and ~
the items ~ account !9_ which the payment was !9_ be applied.
(Emphasis added.)
In Western
58-23-14. 5,

Ready-Mix this court held that an identical prior statute,

precluded recovery by a materialman against an owner who had

failed to provide a payment bond as required by 14-2-1 Utah Code Annoted
1953.

The subcontractor in the present case takes the position that 58A-l-19

Utah Code Annotated
'JJPIY

1953 operates in a very narrow field, and does not

to cases other than those involving mechanic's liens or failures to

' IJtain bonds as required by 14-2-1.

Public contracts, and sureties on public

contracts, it is argued, gain no benefit from the statute.

- 5 -
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The underscored portion of the statute refers only to cases in which
lien is claimed for materials furnished or labor performed

It does not

rH··

to public contracts or to bonds required for private contracts
But

the

statute

does

more

than

refer

to

lien

claims

ThP

,c

sentence of the section requires subcontractors and materialmen, m any ca·.
in which any owner or contractor makes payment, to demand a designation ,·,;
the account and the items of account to which
Where

the

owner

or

contractor

has

not

the payment is to appl\·

designated

the

account,

th'

subcontractor or materialman must demand a designation
The question arises as to whether the obligation of the subcontractor or
materialman to demand a designation of the account creates a duty, and hence
a corresponding right, without a remedy?

Can a subcontractor or materialman

on a public contract thumb his nose at the owner or contractor, refuse
demand a designation of the account, and suffer no consequences from his
failure to comply with the statute?
Western Ready-Mix would seem to indicate that owners and contractor'
have some remedy against persons other than lien claimants, because the case
addresses itself primarily to the failure to bond.

Moreover, this court m the

past has treated the bonding statutes and the lien statutes as analogous
King Bros. , Inc. v. Utah QIT Kiln Co. , 13 Utah2d 339, 374 P. 2d 254 (1962J
There seems to be no reason for applying the statute to lien claims, bu1
not applying it to other construction contracts in which

no lien claJ.ID

15

involved, either because the time to file had run or because a public contrcct
is involved.

The Western Ready-Mix court applied the statute by analogy "

a bonding-type situation, and it is submitted that the statute should be ' 0
applied in this case.

- 6 -
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As

pointed

§ SS 02. p

out

in

2A

Sutherland

Statutory

Construction

(4th ed.)

380, we find the following:

Remedies made available by statute have been extended by
<'nurts to permit their use to enforce other rights than those
mentioned in the statute, where there is no perceivable reason to
differentiate between the rights mentioned and those not mentioned
1n regard to the suitability of the statutory remedy. And an array
of statutory provisions authorizing the use of injunctive remedies in
situations where they would not have been available according to
traditwnal doctrine has been considered sufficient basis for
extending the remedy of an injunction to other situations not unlike
those to which the statutes specifically pertained. * * *
The author also states, in § 55.03, p. 383:
If a statute which creates a right does not indicate expressly
the remedy, one is implied, and resort may be had to the common
law, or the general method of obtaining relief which has displaced
or supplemented the common law.
And where a statute imposes a
duty but is silent as to when it is to be performed, a reasonable
time is implied.

The

statute

contractors,

under

and

materialmen.

consideration

establishes

a

duty

creates
on

the

a

right

in

owners

and

part of subcontractors

and

A remedy should be implied, and the remedy that should be

imµlied is that payments made by an owner or contractor from funds received
for a particular construction project should be applied as payment for labor
and materials supplied to that project.

The
applied

subcontractor in
because

Annotated
con tract

1953,
bonds.

it

is

contrary

part of
It

this

the

argues

case argues that 58A-l-19 should not be
to

the

provisions of 63-56-38 Utah Code

present statutory scheme relating to public
that

the

following

provision in 63-56-38 is

mc:ons1stent:
(3) Any person who has furnished labor or material to the
contractor or subcontractor for the work provided in the
contract * * * [and who has not been paid] shall have the right !2.
sue <:'.~ the payment bond for ~ amount .unpaid !!! the time the
suit ~ instituted and !2. prosecute the act10n for the amount due
Q!~ person.

- 7 -

86h

The argument misses the point of 58A- l - l 9, which is a statute specif \'ir:
acts

that

will

connection

constitute

with

payment

construction

provisions of paragraph (3)

for

projects.
do not

labor

and

If

materials

58A-l-19

furnisher! ,

applies,

thin

come into effect, because th1"rt ,.

arnoun t unpaid.

II

BECAUSE OF THE PROVISIONS OF 58A-l-19 U.C A
IS NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT.

1953, THERE

In this case there is no dispute as to the source of the funds used c:.
the contractor to pay $52, 500 to the subcontractor, or as to the fact that
subcontractor

did not demand a

tht

designation of the account to which thE

payment was to be applied, or as to the fact that the payments were applied
to other accounts.
If the statute is interpreted as suggested under point I,

there is n'.

genuine issu,.e as to any material fact and the surety is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.
If

the

statute

is

not given

that effect,

but is given

the effect

Ji

permitting the owner or contractor to designate the account upon learning
a misapplication, there is still no genuine issue as to any material fact
affidavit

of John W.

Maughan is

to the effect

that upon

er

Tht

learning of the

misapplication of the payment he notified the subcontractor that the paymenr
should be applied to the Monticello projects.

The subcontractor argues thac

the subcontractor's president states that no request was made for applic"r" r.
of the payment, either before or after its application, but the affidavit is

11 "'

included in the record on appeal and, in any event, was not filed un Lil aflt'
the court had ruled on the surety's motion for summary judgment (R

- 8 -
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CONCLUSION
Under
. 11

the

provisions

of

58A-l-19

Utah

Code

Annotated

1953,

bcontractors and materialmen have an obligation to demand from the owner

, ,_,_,ntractor a

designation of the account to which the payment is to be

Although

the statute specifies a remedy only in connection with

persuns claiming of liens against the property, the word lien has often been
u'ed interchangeably with claims under bonding statutes,
~eady-Mix

and in Western

Concrete Co. v. Rodriguez, 567 P 2d 1118 (Utah 1977), the court

applied the statute to a situation in which an owner was being sued for
failure to furnish a bond as required by 14-2-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953.
The remedies provided by the statute should be extended to all owners
and contractors involved in construction projects, inasmuch as there is no
reason for drawing a distinction between public and private contracts so far
as the remedy is concerned.
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

~ru{ge-~f~i~e.,.~d.;.'~·~.,,·~'--=-~--

{.Joel- R.
Bryce E. Roe
ROE AND FOWLER
340 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondent
S&H Insurance Company
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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